



A HISTORY OF REFORMS
DANIELA ANDRÉN*
Since the 1980s,Sweden has had a much higher rate of
absence due to sickness than most other countries
(OECD Health Data 2002,Nyman et al.2002,Barmby
et al. 2002, Osterkamp 2002).1 The number of people
who have received sickness benefits at some time dur-
ing 2002 was approximately 862,000 (i.e., almost
10 percent of the 9 million inhabitants of Sweden),
having increased by 161,000 (or 18.68 percent) since
1999. This considerable increasing trend raised con-
cerns related to the health of the working-age popula-
tion, their work environment and job demands, but
also about the size of the compensation and the source
of payment (social insurance and/or the employer).
This trend has also led to questions of whether gener-
ous insurance not only compensates for sickness and
disability but also induces such outcomes.
Consequently,one of the solutions of the Swedish gov-
ernment (and also the Netherlands and Germany) was
to initiate changes in the sick payment schemes that
reduce the economic compensation to be received dur-
ing sick leaves.Thus,a general view exists that sickness
absence is responsive to the individual cost of absence
or economic incentives. Moreover, the government is
collaborating with the unions and the employers in
finding other solutions that can stop (and even reduce)
the increasing trend of the sickness absenteeism. Even
though some of them are based on the previous expe-
riences,these new solutions are not linked explicitly to
the lessons learned in almost 50 years of experience
with the social insurance.It is the goal of this article to
point out the changes and lessons learned from them,
with special emphasis on economic incentives.
The institutional framework
Social insurance in Sweden is compulsory and pub-
licly administrated, and aims at providing financial
security in case of sickness or disability,for families
and children, and for the elderly, by reallocating
funds over periods of time and between individuals
in society. Every resident of Sweden is covered.
Benefits are provided partly through replacement
of lost income and partly through allowances. The
social insurance sectors (sickness insurance, work
injury insurance, the national basic pension, sur-
vivor’s pension,partial pension,and parental insur-
ance) are financed wholly or in part by revenue
from social security charges that are collected from
employers and from the self-employed, as well as
from general and special pension charges.
The proportion of expenditure covered by these
charges varies, and has changed over the years.
Some social insurance benefits are financed wholly
by central government funds, such as child
allowance, housing allowance, and certain other
allowances for families with children, as well as a
number of benefits for the disabled (such as car
allowance), and housing supplement for pension-
ers.Other benefits,such as attendance allowance,is
today partly financed by the municipalities, where-
as a number of smaller public insurance plans are
financed by premiums and/or the yield from funds;
among these are voluntary pensions, voluntary
sickness insurance, voluntary occupational health
insurance, and small business insurance.
Every resident in Sweden, whether they were born
there, immigrated, or merely came to work or
study, is registered with a social insurance office
when they reach the age of 16. People are eligible
for sickness compensation if they cannot work
because they lose 25 percent or more from their
working capacity. The National Insurance Act
(1962:381), which monitors the social insurance
benefits in Sweden, gives no general definition of
sickness, but according to the National Social
Insurance Board’s recommendation, sickness is an
abnormal physical or mental condition; if it
reduces normal work capacity by at least 25 per-
cent, the individual can qualify for compensation
of earnings loss due to sickness. Normal work
capacity is defined as either the ability to perform
the same task, or the ability to earn the same
income, as prior to sickness.
The compensation may be full, three-quarters, half
or one-quarter,depending on the extent of absence
from work.The size of the compensation is related
to the previous earnings of the insured people.
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They can also get a special
parental allowance if they cannot
go to work because their children
are sick. If they have to stop
working (temporarily or perma-
nently) due to reduced working
capacity, they are eligible to
receive a disability pension.
Self-employed people are not
covered by the system just
described, and must pay a sepa-
rate “premium” for their sick-
ness insurance, together with
their taxes. People who have no
income or very low income can
receive tax-free voluntary sick-
ness allowance from the social
insurance office. Normal sick
pay and sickness benefit are tax-
able like regular income.
Repeated change of the rules
In 1955, compulsory sickness
insurance was introduced in
Sweden. The sickness benefit
covered around 65% of the
expected net earnings of the
insured person, and it was
reduced after the ninetieth sick
day. In practice, the compensa-
tion level was higher due to the
effects of the marginal tax and to
the fact that the sickness benefit
was tax-free.There was a waiting
period of three days and a limit
of two years replacement in
long-term sickness. Since 1955,
there have been many changes
to the rules of sickness insurance
(the most important are listed in
the Box), which may be grouped
with respect to the following
aspects:
1)  The compensation level.F o r
example, in 1963, there was an
increase of the daily replacement rate, i.e. the min-
imum amount of the daily cash benefit during sick-
ness; in 1967, the replacement rate increased to
approximately 80 percent of the expected net
wage, and in 1974 it increased to 90 percent of the
expected gross earnings. In 1974, a sickness cash
benefit was made taxable and eligible for the cal-
culation of the earnings-based, old-age pension.
Since March 1991, the previous uniform rate of 90
percent has not been paid until the 91st day; only
65 percent was paid for the first three days, fol-
Box
The main changes of rules regarding the compensation of income loss due
to sickness in Sweden
• 1955: According to the 1955 Law, the sickness benefit would cover
around 65 percent of the expected earnings of the insured person. In
practice, the compensation level was higher due to the effects of the
marginal tax and to the fact that the sickness benefit was tax-free.
• 1963: The National Insurance Act (allmän försäkring låg, AFL, 1962:381)
substitutes the 1955 Law.
• 1967: The compensation level becomes 80 percent, and the money from
sickness benefit is not taxed. A waiting day (karensdag) and the two so-
called “free days” are introduced.
• 1974: The compensation level is 90 percent. The money from sickness
benefits counts for the national supplementary pension scheme, ATP
(allmän tilläggspension), but they are now taxed.
• July 1977: The Work Injuries Insurance Act (Lagen om arbetsskade-
försäkring, LAF 1976:380) covers 100 percent of the income loss due to
work injury or poisoning.
• Nov. 1979: The sickness benefit is paid at maximum once per week.
• Jan. 1982: Participants in an active labor market program (AMU) must
report their absence due to sickness to the social insurance office.
• Jan. 1985: A new system (Dagmar-systemet) of compensation is
introduced from the social insurance of public health authority. It
contains both public and private outpatient treatment. Additionally, the
payment of the sickness benefit for the state employees is simplified, and
the compensation is calculated based on a stereotyped model that it is
applied by the state institutions for all spells less than 14 days.
• Jan. 1986: A pilot scheme of 1/4 and 3/4 compensation for sickness
benefit and travel compensation (10 municipalities in 3 counties) is
tested, which will be extended until July 1990. The Dagmar system now
even applies for the compensation for hospital costs.
• 1987: Starting with December 1987, the waiting day was abolished, and a
sickness cash benefit was provided from the day the sickness was
reported to the social insurance office. However, a cash benefit was now
only provided for scheduled workdays during the first fourteen days of
absence.
• July 1990: Partial compensation of 3/4 and 1/4 is introduced in the whole
country.
• Mar. 1991: The compensation rate from the sickness benefit is reduced
from 90 percent to 65 percent for the first3 days, 80 percent for day 4 to
day 90. The collective agreement of 10 percent is maintained.
• 1992: The “employer period”, which requires the employers to pay for
the first 14 days of sickness is introduced. Since January 1992 there has
been a two-week employer period, except the time period. The
compensation rate is increased 75 percent for the first 3 days of
compensation and to 90 percent thereafter.
• April 1993 (a): A waiting day for sick pay and/or sickness benefit is
reintroduced . The sickness benefit rate is reduced from 90 percent to
80 percent from day 90. A “5-day repeated-spell” rule is introduced,
according to which if a sick person records a new case within a five day
period, the new spell is seen as a continuation of the previous one re-
garding the waiting day, the compensation rate and the length of the sick
pay.  The compensation rate for rehabilitation is reduced from 100 per-
cent to 95 percent.
• July 1993 (b): The sickness cash benefit rate is reduced from 80 percent
to 70 percent from the 365 day of each sickness spell, but the
compensation of 80 percent may be kept in certain cases, such as medical
treatment.
• June 1996: The compensation level is 75 percent all over for both sickness
cash benefit and rehabilitation cash benefit.
• Jan. 1997: The “employer period” is extended to the first 28 days (up to
and including March 1998, when is reduced to the first 14 days).
• Jan. 1998: The payment level for full sickness benefit is 80 percent of the
income qualifying for sickness allowance, for entire sickness period,
excepting the waiting day.
• July 2003: The sick pay period increased from 14 to 21 days, and there is
a compensation ceiling for the sick unemployed that cannot be higher
than the highest unemployment benefit.lowed by 80 percent through the 90th day. From 1
July 1993, the sickness cash benefit decreased from
80 percent to 70 percent after the 365th day of sick-
ness, except in special cases (medical treatment).
2) The covered period, i.e., waiting days period and
a maximum period.In 1963,the time limit for long-
term sickness was abolished (except for old-age
pensioners); in 1967, the waiting days were abo-
lished except for the day of calling in sick, and in
1987,even this day was abolished;in 1993 a waiting
day was reintroduced.
3)  Partial compensation. Only 100 percent and
50 percent benefits were provided until 1 July 1990;
since then 25 percent and 75 percent have also been
available.These partial sickness benefits are received
in connection with rehabilitation for persons return-
ing to work after a long period of sickness.
4) The source of funds, i.e., social insurance and/or
employer. Before 1 January 1992, all compensa-
tions for earnings lost during sickness were paid by
the social insurance system, but since then, during
the first days of a sickness period (called the sick
pay period or the employer period), employees
receive sick pay directly from their employer.From
1992 to 1996, the sick pay period was 14 days, then
through March 1998, it was 28 days, and since then,
it has once again been 14 days. Since July 2003, the
employer period is 21 days.
Most of these rules influence the economic incen-
tives. More exactly, the compensation level can
affect the individual decision of going to work even
if they do not feel good, or the individual decision
of not going to work even though their health sta-
tus and working capacity would allow them to
work. Additionally, the compensation level and/or
other institutional settings (such as the eligibility,
the duration of entitlement for benefits, etc.), may
affect the individual decision of choosing among
various systems of the welfare system. Thus, the
sickness absence is expected to be responsive to
the individual cost of absence or economic incen-
tives. Therefore, the effect of economic incentives
on the sickness absenteeism can be analyzed from
at least three perspectives, all of them having a
direct or indirect effect on the individuals’ health:
1) to what extent the institutional setting of the
sickness insurance may allow for the insured
employee to be affected by economic incentives;
2) to what extent the sickness insurance is a better
alternative to other states, such as unemployment
insurance, temporary child allowance, social
allowance,and disability pension;3) to what extent
the sickness insurance may decrease the risk expo-
sure to less friendly work environment and/or job
requirements.
Facts and empirical evidence
It is well known that Sweden is one of the countries
with very generous sickness insurance (the same as
in Norway and in the Netherlands).The generosity
of the Swedish insurance system varies across time,
being more generous during the good times and
less generous during the bad times. This trend has
been revealed by empirical tests (e.g., Henrekson
and Persson 2002), but it is also easily shown by
simple plots of the evolution of the sickness absen-
teeism in Sweden over time (Figures 1–4). The
National Social Insurance Board makes available a
huge amount of data on sickness absenteeism in
the form of aggregated time series and several
micro databases (some of them longitudinal). At
the aggregate level, for example, three main indi-
cators are presented: days of sickness with cash
benefit  (sjukpenningdagar), the sick rate per
insured person (sjuktalet), and the sickness fre-
quency rate (sjukpenningfall). The sick rate per
insured person represents the annual number of
benefit days (full or partial) per insured person in
relation to the number of persons insured for sick-
ness benefit at the end of the year. Sick pay to
employees from the employer is not included. The
sickness frequency rate stands for the annual num-
ber of concluded cases of illness, that led to benefit
payments viewed in relation to the number of
insured individuals, at the end of the year.These
indicators are aggregated by year, quarter, and
month, and by different characteristics (gender,
age, region, etc.).
Sweden has had at least 13 changes in the rules of
the sick leave compensation system since 1955
(1963, 1967, 1974, 1987, 1991, 1992, 1993a, 1993b,
1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 2003), which are repre-
sented by the bold circles of the lines in Figure 1.
There have also been changes in the rules of the
administrative process that monitor the sickness
cases, such as the requirement of a certificate from
a doctor as soon as the spell exceeds a certain num-
ber of days, and the qualification criteria for
receiving long-term sickness benefits. There is
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empirical evidence of the effect of the rule change
on sickness absenteeism2, but some of the fluctua-
tions are caused by the changes in the definition of
the indicators. For example, before 1977, the sick
rate per insured person is computed using the total
of all compensated days, divided by the number of
all insured people, i.e., all residents of at least
16 years of age.
All figures indicate that sick-
ness absence tends to vary
cyclically.3 This may suggest
effects of the change in the
rules of the sickness insurance
and/or disciplining effects of
unemployment, but may also
reflect changes in the composi-
tion of the workforce and/or
that health is affected adversely
in boom periods.There is empi-
rical evidence that when the
benefits become more gener-
ous, i.e., higher compensation
rates compared to the previous
period (as in 1963, 1967, 1974,
1987 and 1998), the number of
sick days increase, and when the insurance system
becomes more austere, i.e., lower compensation
rates (as in 1991 and 1995),the number of sick days
fall (e.g., Lantto and Lindblom, 1987, Bäckman,
1998, Lidwall and Thoursie, 2000, Andrén, 2001a,
Johansson and Palme, 2002, Henrekson and
Persson, 2002). Additionally to the effect of the
compensation rate,other constraints also affect the
decision of work absence due to sickness. For
example,a doctor’s certificate was required in most
of the cases only from day eight of the sickness
spell.Therefore, one might expect in some cases of
seven days or less that people would go to work
instead of taking sick leave.There is empirical evi-
dence that shows that the closer the beginning of
the spell was to the following weekend, the shorter
was the spell, and absences that started on the
weekend (especially Sunday) lasted the longest
(see Andrén 2001a). Additionally, watching sport-
ing events on television is
found to explain some of the




3 Arai and Skogman Thoursie (2000)
using industry-region panel data for the
period 1989:1-1999:4, find a stable nega-
tive correlation between sick-rates and
shares of temporary contracts, implying
that procyclical sick-rate is compatible
with the idea that sick-report incentives
are procyclical.
4 Skogman Thoursie (2002) estimate the
potential abuse of the sickness insurance
system in Sweden by comparing the
change between the number of men and
women who report sick during a popular
sporting event (i.e., the World Champion-
ship cross-country skiing competition
over 30 kilometers in Oberstdorf, Ger-
many,on 12 February 1987 and the Winter
Olympic Games in Calgary, Canada,
13–28 February 1988) and a preceding
time period.
2 For example, Latto and Lindblom (1987), Johansson and Palme,
(1996, 2002), Johansson and Brännäs (1998), Bäckman (1998),
Lidwall and Thoursie (2000), Andrén (2001a, 2001b, 2001c),
Broström et al. (2002), Henrekson and Persson (2002), and
Skogman Thoursie (2002). These studies used different databases
and statistical methods, the most common setup being to analyze
how absenteeism differs across individuals with respect to individ-
ual characteristics (age, gender, marital status, earnings, etc.).
Economic incentives are captured by the after-tax wage rate,or the
difference (or ratio) between the wage rate and the sick-leave com-
pensation.The analyses are done either at a single point in time, or
over time.The latest data format (being time series or longitudinal)
allows for variation in economic incentives, individuals differing
with respect to marginal tax rates, compensation levels, or other
aspects of the insurance scheme. Johansson and Brannas (1998)
analyzed the economic incentives of work absence using a house-
hold model,which does not seem to add any more explanation than
the individual model, estimated by Johansson and Palme (1996).After the unpaid waiting day was abolished in
December 1987,there was a significant jump in the
average number of compensated days of absence
due to sickness, even though during the first two
weeks only scheduled workdays were covered.
After the replacement rates were lowered (espe-
cially during the first three days) in early 1991, the
absence rate fell drastically. Besides the high
unemployment and lower replacement rate, the
introduction of a two-week “employer period” in
January 1992 (represented by the light circles in
Figure 4), contributed to a drop in average days of
absence due to sickness. During the 1990s, the
unemployment rate increased very much (from
less than 2 percent in 1991 to more than 10 percent
in the middle of the 1990s). The unemployed are
also covered by sickness insurance, and for exam-
ple, according to government estimates for 1999,
unemployed people, including students, reported
about 20 percent of the total
sick days. This may be
explained by the fact that those
who become unemployed may
have previously had a higher
rate of work absence than the
rest of the labor force.
Additionally, sickness insur-
ance seems to be a more attrac-
tive choice than unemployment
insurance, which offers a lower
compensation rate5 and a cov-
erage limit of 300 workdays.6
Figures 1–3 show that there are
differences between the sick-
ness absenteeism of women and
men. Even though women’s participation in the
labor market was relatively low, women were sick
more days per year than men until 1966. During
the period 1967–1980, men were sick more days
than women. Afterwards, until the present, the
sickness insurance compensated more days of sick-
ness for women. The difference between the com-
pensated days of women and men increased from
less than 1 percent (or 273,000 days) in 1981, year
to year, until 1990, when it was 26.60 percent (or
13.3 million days). Afterwards, the relative differ-
ence fluctuated around this value until 1994, when
it started to increase again: from 26.51 percent in
1995 to 69.3 percent (or 28.5 million days) in 2002.
Empirical evidence shows that the economic incen-
tives appear to be the predominant factor in
explaining the higher work-absence rate of females
(e.g., Henrekson and Persson, 2002, Broström et
al., 2002).




5 The sickness benefit for unemployed
people was adjusted from 1 July 2003 to
prevent it from being higher than unem-
ployment benefit. Before, many unem-
ployed people, and especially white-col-
lar workers, received higher benefits
when they were sick, because of trade
union insurance and other schemes (e.g.,
the ceiling level for the maximum com-
pensation). The government believes
that it is appropriate that unemployed
workers should not receive a higher
income when they are sick than other
workers do.
6 For example, Larsson (2002) analyses
how the sickness report rate and the
length of the subsequent sick period
among the unemployed are affected by
the limit of 300 workdays for unemploy-
ment benefits,and the difference in max-
imum compensation paid by unemploy-
ment and sickness insurances.Her results
suggest that sick reports increase as the
unemployment benefit expiration date
approaches, and an incentive effect on
the sick-report rate due to a greater com-
pensation paid by the sickness insurance.CESifo DICE Report 3/2003 59
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For example, one third of the gender difference in
work absence behavior during 1990–1991 can be
attributed to differences in costs of being absent
(see Broström et al. 2002).Another explanation of
the gender difference can be attributed to a rela-
tively high stock and/or inflow of sick women
(Figures 2 and 3).For example,since 1998 the num-
ber of women who have been listed sick longer
than a year has more than doubled, whereas the
number of men has grown by 80 percent.
Conclusions
It is almost impossible to draw definite conclusions
about the difference between Sweden and other
countries, but statistical evidence (e.g., Nyman et
al. 2002) gives indications that the age structure of
the Swedish work force, the high level of employ-
ment among older people, the high frequency of
gainful employment among women and the high
proportion of permanent employees have con-
tributed to a higher rate of absence due to sickness.
The total of transfers for sickness and disability
through the social insurance system constitute an
important part of the economy, and policymakers
are occasionally motivated (for example, by govern-
ment deficits) to reduce them. However, regardless
of the magnitude of the effects of the economic
incentives,the health status of the people is the most
important factor. Therefore, there are always indi-
viduals who are insensitive to economic incentives.7
Sickness insurance aims to help such persons. It is
also aimed to help prevent illness.Therefore, being
absent from work due to a temporary illness might
imply an increasing probability of maintaining a
good health status, both in the short and long run.
Consequently, decreasing the replacement rate of
sickness insurance increases the cost of making
such investments.
Nevertheless, total expenditure for any particular
program, such as sickness and disability insurance,
depends not just on the average expenditure level
per recipient and on their length of stay in the pro-
gram but also on the total number of recipients.
Therefore, in attempting to limit sickness and dis-
ability expenditures, policymakers could choose to
limit the average daily benefit or the duration of
stay, or to restrict the flow of new recipients into
the program. Unfortunately, the effects of policies
to limit duration of stay are uncertain, because
there is not very much known about the duration
of sickness and temporary disability spells.
In conclusion, sickness insurance is a potential
source to maintain relatively good health of the
working age population, and even to decrease the
health care cost during retirement. However, it
seems that preventing employees from diminishing
their work capacity is one of the most desirable
solutions. The work capacity of the individual
should be better utilized and lost work capacity
should largely be regained.This should be achieved
in collaboration with relevant authorities and
other agencies. Regardless the employers’ cost for
prevention (e.g., improving work environment, job
requirements and working conditions), their con-
tribution to the social sickness insurance seems to
be a guarantee of better health.
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